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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

Case No. 990297-CA

JASON RANDY BIGGS,

:

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for criminal homicide, a
first degree felony.

This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal

pursuant to the pourover provision of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(j)(1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court clearly err in determining that the

State had carried its burden of demonstrating that it struck the
only minority member of the jury venire for reasons unrelated to
his race?
The trial court's finding that the State did not engage in
purposeful racial discrimination presents a factual question.
Accordingly, that determination will not be set aside unless it
is clearly erroneous.

State v. Hiqqenbotham, 917 P.2d 545, 548

1
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(Utah 1996)(citations omitted); State v. Bowman, 945 P.2d 153,
155 (Utah App. 1997) (citation omitted).

In order to show clear

error, defendant must marshal all the evidence in support of the
court's determination and then demonstrate that the evidence and
all inferences that may fairly be drawn from that evidence are
insufficient to support the trial court's finding.

State v.

Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 475-76 (Utah 1990).
2.

Does the record contain sufficient evidence to support

the jury's verdict that defendant murdered Kenny Leiter?
A criminal conviction will be reversed for insufficient
evidence only when the evidence is "so inconclusive or so
inherently improbable that ^reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt' that the defendant committed the
crime."

State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994)(quoting

State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983), superseded on
other grounds. State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987)).
3.

Should this Court consider for the first time on appeal

defendant's unpreserved claim of prosecutorial misconduct?
No standard of review applies where an issue is unpreserved.
4.

Did the trial court err when, three days after the

issuance of State v. Lopes, 980 P.2d 191 (1999), it imposed a
gang enhancement pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 7 6-3-302.1?
The trial court's "interpretation of the effect of a prior
judicial decision, whether one of its own or one of another

2
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court" presents a question of law, reviewed for correctness, with
no deference accorded the trial court.

State v. Montoya, 887

P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1994).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
No specific provisions are necessary to the resolution of
this case.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with one count of criminal homicide,
murder, for shooting Kenny Leiter on January 2, 1996 (R. 2-4).
After a two-day trial, a jury convicted defendant as charged (R.
277).

Following a presentence evaluation, the trial court

sentenced defendant to a minimum mandatory term in the Utah State
Prison of nine years to life, including a gang enhancement.

As

an additional enhancement for the use of a firearm in the
commission of the offense, the court imposed a consecutive term
not to exceed five years (R. 311-12).
restitution in the amount of $9288.01.

The court also ordered
This timely appeal

followed (R. 313). The Utah Supreme Court subsequently poured
the case over to this Court (R. 324).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
At a 1995 New Year's Eve party in a condominium clubhouse in
Murray, a young man associated with the West Side Piru Bloods
stole a baggie of marijuana from an associate of the Inner City
Crips (R. 328: 229, 236). Because the Bloods outnumbered the

3
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Crips, the Crips let the incident pass (Id. at 192). The Crips
were angry, however, and within the next day or so, "pretty much
everybody" learned about what had happened at the party (Id. at
193) .
On the evening of January 2, 1996, three young men
associated with the Crips - defendant, Jody Carroll, and Trevor
Symes - were driving near the condominium complex when they saw
Kenny Leiter, the victim, and Lori Nelson, his girlfriend,
walking towards a nearby convenience store (Id. at.64-66, 170,
173).

Trevor Symes believed that Leiter and Nelson, who both

associated with the Bloods, had been at the New Year's Eve party
and, accordingly, that "they" had stolen the marijuana (Id. at
66, 135, 149, 173-75).x

The three Crips decided to follow the

couple and beat up Leiter (Id. at 67, 176).
Kenny Leiter and Lori Nelson entered the convenience store
(Id. at 66, 133). Meanwhile, Jody Carroll parked the car at a
nearby fast food restaurant and removed a tire iron from the
trunk of his vehicle (Id^ at 70, 178). With Carroll in the lead,
the three Crips prepared to confront the couple who, having
completed their shopping, were now returning home to the
condominiums (Id. at 68-70, 134, 177).

1

The testimony of Symes implies that as an associate of
the Bloods, Leiter would be accountable for the acts of his
fellow associates, regardless of whether he personally took the
marijuana. See R. 328: 173-75.
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Carroll approached Leiter and Nelson and asked for a
cigarette (Id. at 71-72, 137, 210). They refused the request and
kept walking (Id. at 137). He asked again.

When they refused a

second time, they turned and quickly realized something was amiss
(Id. at 72-73, 138). Carroll began striking Leiter across the
chest with the tire iron (IcL at 73-74, 139, 179) .2 In response,
Leiter pulled out a knife (Id^ at 74, 138, 180, 203). Carroll
then backed off and threw the tire iron at Leiter, hitting him in
the chest (Id^ at 76-77, 106, 180-81).
With his cohort now unarmed, defendant, armed with a .38
caliber handgun, moved forward to join the fight.
181).

(Id. at 81-82,

Leiter was standing still, poised, waiting (Id. at 84,

112, 141). Either defendant or Carroll then stated, ''You're
fucked now.

We have a gat" (Id. at 140, 152, 181, 206).

Jody Carroll testified that when he saw defendant's gun, he
turned to walk away, leaving Leiter standing there, saying
nothing.

Carroll then heard the gun click several times.

Looking back over his shoulder as the weapon finally fired,
Carroll saw Leiter hit (Id. at 83, 86-87, 111-12).

Trevor Symes

testified that after he heard the gun click, he turned and ran

The tire iron was variously described as a crowbar and as
a device used "to jack the jack up" when preparing to change a
tire (R. 328: 107).
5
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towards the car, and then heard the gun go off (Id. at 182) .3
Defendant, Jody Carroll, and Trevor Symes, having all run
from the scene of the shooting, met up again at the car and drove
away (Id. at 89, 184-85).4

Trevor Symes testified that as they

left, defendant exclaimed, "I blasted him.

I don't know if I got

him" (Id. at 185). Symes also testified that right after the
shooting, they drove to a McDonald's where defendant's girlfriend
was working.

They discussed the shooting to the extent "that

[defendant] was supposed to be with her for an alibi" (Id. at
188).

Jody Carroll testified that sometime later "defendant came

to my house and said that the cops were looking for us.

To keep

my mouth shut, basically" (Id. at 124).
Meanwhile, Kenny Leiter's companion, Lori Nelson, had heard
the same clicks and the same shot that the Crips had heard.

In

addition, she heard "this loud howl [from Leiter] like he had
been shot" (Id^ at 142). She, too, fled (IcL_ at 141-42).

As she

was fumbling with the entry code to the condominium complex,
Leiter caught up with her.

The door finally opened, and they

3

Jody Carroll struck a bargain with the police, exchanging
his testimony in this case for a reduced felony charge (R. 328:
96, 119-20). Trevor Symes, who also testified for the State, was
interviewed by the police but not arrested for any crime in
connection with this case (Id. at 209).
4

Within the next several, days, Carroll disposed of the
gun, which defendant had stowed under the seat of Carroll's car
(ISU at 91, 94-95, 114-15, 122, 184).
6
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began running down the hallway.
256).

Leiter collapsed (Id. at 143,

Lori Nelson testified, "He was just laying there with a

lot of blood coming out of his mouth. . . . he just had a

- -

like a scared or something look on his face with just tons of
blood coming out of his mouth" (Id. at 143).
Kenny Leiter died in the hallway where he fell.

According

to the medical examiner, he bled to death, the result of a bullet
piercing his carotid artery (Id. 330, 335).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant first argues that the State used one of its
peremptory challenges to strike the only minority juror on the
panel for racially-motivated reasons.

The State, however,

provided race-neutral reasons for its strike, and the trial court
determined that the State did not strike the juror with any
racially discriminatory intent.

Consequently, to overturn the

court's finding, defendant must marshal the evidence supporting
the finding and then demonstrate that it is clearly erroneous.
He has not done so.
Second, defendant argues that the evidence of both his
identity and his intent was insufficient to support the jury's
verdict.

As to identity, defendant argues, in essence, that the

jury believed the wrong witnesses.

Credibility, however, is a

matter left to the finder of fact and will not be revisited on
appeal.

As to intent, defendant pointed a loaded .38 caliber
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handgun at his victim in the midst of a physical fight and then
pulled the trigger multiple times.

The very nature of these acts

supports the jury's determination that defendant committed the
murder with the necessary intent.
Third, defendant asserts a prosecutorial misconduct claim,
unpreserved on the record.

Moreover, the trial court refused to

accede to defendant's attempt to supplement the record.

Absent

the contents of the supplementation, the issue has not been
preserved for appellate review.
Finally, defendant correctly asserts that the trial court
imposed a gang enhancement in violation of the rule of law
articulated in State v. Lopes, 980 P.2d 191 (Utah 1999), issued
three days prior to defendant's sentencing.

Consequently, while

defendant's murder conviction should be affirmed, the gang
enhancement conviction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1
should be reversed and remanded for a new trial.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT
THE STATE CARRIED ITS BURDEN OF
DEMONSTRATING THAT IT STRUCK THE
ONLY MINORITY VENIREPERSON FOR
REASONS UNRELATED TO HIS RACE
Defendant asserts that his murder conviction should be
reversed because the jury panel was tainted by racial bias.
of App. at 9.

Specifically, he argues that the trial court

8
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Br.

denied a panoply of his state and federal constitutional rights
when it determined that the State's peremptory challenge to
remove the only minority juror from the venire was not racially
motivated.

Id. at 5, 9.

As to the juror's ethnicity, the trial

court observed only that the juror, Lance Masina, "did appear to
me [to have] certain Pacific Islander characteristics" (R. 328:
216) .
At the outset, defendant has properly preserved but a single
ground for his claim.

That is, in the trial court, defendant

grounded his substantive argument in the federal equal protection
analysis set forth in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
While defendant mentioned other state and federal constitutional
rights in passing, he never offered any legal analysis based upon
those rights.

Furthermore, the ruling of the trial court is

clearly framed as a response to a Batson challenge.
214-16 or addendum A.

See R. 328:

Because defendant only argued and the

trial court only ruled upon a Batson challenge, that is the only
proper subject for review now.

State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 337

n.4 (Utah 1991)(where defendant raised only Batson challenge in
trial court, reviewing court addresses only federal equal
protection issue); see also State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 435
(Utah App. 1990)(grounds not argued or ruled upon in trial court
will not be considered on appeal, absent showing of plain error
or special circumstances)(citations omitted).

9
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A challenge premised on Batson is resolved by applying a
three-part analysis:
*Under our Batson jurisprudence, once the
opponent of a peremptory challenge has made
out a prima facie case of racial
discrimination (step 1), the burden of
production shifts to the proponent of the
strike to come forward with a race-neutral
explanation (step 2). If a race-neutral
explanation is tendered, the trial court must
then decide (step 3) whether the opponent of
the strike has proved purposeful racial
discrimination.'
State v. Hiaaenbotham, 917 P.2d 545, 547 (Utah 1996)(quoting

-

Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767 (1995)(citations omitted));
accord State v. Cantu, 778 P.2d 517, 518 (Utah 1989) ("Cantu II").
Typically, to establish the first step - a prima facie case
of racial discrimination - defendant must demonstrate specific
facts and circumstances in support of such a case.

See Batson,

476 U.S. at 97-98; accord Cantu II, 788 P.2d at 518 (citations
omitted).

However, "[w]here the proponent of the peremptory

challenge fails to contest the sufficiency of the prima facie
case at trial and merely provides a rebuttal explanation for the
challenge, the issue of whether a prima facie case was
established is waived."

Higgenbotham, 917 P.2d at 547 (citing

State v. Macial, 854 P.2d 543, 545 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 862
P.2d 1356 (Utah 1993) and State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 777
(Utah App.), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 317 (Utah 1991)).
In this case, the prosecutor immediately rebutted the

10
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challenge by explaining his rationale for striking the juror,
without first contesting the establishment of a prima facie case.
See R. 328: 215 or addendum A.

Accordingly, whether defendant,

in fact, established a prima facie case is not relevant to the
Batson analysis here because the matter has been waived.

See

Hiaaenbotham, 917 P.2d at 547; accord State v. Merrill. 928 P.2d
401, 403 (Utah App. 1996); Macial, 854 P.2d at 545.
The Batson analysis, therefore, proceeds to step two, with
the burden shifting to the State to provide a race-neutral
explanation for its peremptory strike.
548.

Hiaaenbotham, 917 P.2d at

Notably, the explanation need not be "persuasive, or even

plausible/'

Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768. "'At this [second] step

of the inquiry, the issue is the facial validity of the
prosecutor's explanation.

Unless a discriminatory intent is

inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will
be deemed race neutral.'"

Id., 514 U.S. at 768 (quoting

Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 (plurality opinion); id.
at 374 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment)).
In this case, the prosecutor offered the following
explanation for the peremptory challenge:
[T]he reason Mr. Masina was stricken by the
State was his direct response to a question
posed by the defense counsel of whether they
knew anyone in jail. And Mr. Masina stated
in the affirmative, that he did know people
in jail. And based upon that response, that
is the reason we moved to - we peremptory
[sic] struck Mr. Masina.
11
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The other reason is we thought he was young
and single. It had nothing to do with his
race.
R. 328: 215 or addendum A.5
The prosecution thus offered three reasons for its
peremptory challenge: because the juror knew persons who were
incarcerated; because he was young; and because he was single.
All of these reasons could apply to individuals of any race.

See

Purkett, 514 U.S. at 769 (determining that wearing beards and
mustaches and having long, unkempt hair are race-neutral reasons
for exercising peremptory strikes).

Accordingly, because a

discriminatory intent is not inherent in any of the preferred
reasons, they are race-neutral.

See Hiqqenbotham, 928 P.2d at

548 (stating prosecutor's explanation for challenge is facially
valid if it "does not demonstrate a discriminatory intent").

The

analysis, then, progresses to step three.6

Specifically, defense counsel requested of the court,
"Could you also ask whether any of the prospective jurors have
any friends or close relatives who might be incarcerated at this
time?" The trial court then queried the jury panel: "At least
the last word that you had, do any of you have any friends or
close friends [sic] who are in custody somewhere?" R. 328: 33.
The prosecutor peremptorily struck two of the four jurors who
responded affirmatively. R. 103.
6

Defendant cites to these three factors, concluding from
them that the prosecution failed to provide a race-neutral
explanation for its peremptory strike. Br. of App. at 8.
Nowhere, however, does defendant articulate how these factors
demonstrate a racially discriminatory intent. Because defendant
has failed to develop any legal analysis relevant to Batson's
second step, this Court need not even consider his claim. State
v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984).
12
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In the final step of the Batson inquiry, "the trial court
determines whether the opponent of the strike has carried his
burden of proving purposeful discrimination/'
at 768; accord Hiaaenbotham, 917 P.2d at 548.7

Purkett, 514 U.S.
In this case, the

trial court, after listening to the prosecution's explanation for
striking the juror, stated:
I am persuaded, counsel, that the prosecution
has sufficiently rebutted the notion that
there - that they were out simply to strike
minority panel members of the panel and that
they have provided to me sufficient reason
for having exercised the peremptory challenge
that was wholly unrelated to Mr. Masina's at
least claimed minority status. Therefore,
your motion is denied.
R. 328: 216 or addendum A.

This ruling, in essence, constitutes

a finding that the prosecutor did not strike the juror with any
racially discriminatory intent.
Once the trial court has made such a factual determination,
it is accorded great deference.

This is because

*[in the typical peremptory challenge
inquiry, the decisive question will be
whether counsel's race-neutral explanation
for a peremptory challenge should be
believed. There will seldom be much evidence
bearing on that issue, and the best evidence
often will be the demeanor of the attorney
who exercises the challenge.'
State v. Bowman, 945 P.2d 153, 156 (Utah App. 1997)(quoting

7

Throughout the entire Batson analysis, "the ultimate
burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and
never shifts from, the opponent of the strike." Purkett., 514
U.S. at 768.
13
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Hernandez v. New York. 500 U.S. 352, 365 (1991)(citations
omitted)).
In order to overturn the trial court's factual finding, a
defendant must demonstrate clear error by marshaling all the
evidence in support of the finding and then showing that the
evidence, including all fair inferences that may be drawn from
it, provides insufficient support.
(citations omitted).

Hiqqenbotham, 917 P.2d at 548

In this case, however, defendant has failed

to marshal the evidence.
his claim may be rejected.

Consequently, for this reason alone,
Crackdown v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817

P.2d 789, 800 (Utah 1991).
. Defendant asserts instead that the trial court committed
reversible error by failing to enter necessary findings
subsidiary to its ultimate determination.

Indeed, he argues, the

court was unable to make any such findings because the
prosecutor's rationale for striking the juror was "a mere
excuse."

Br. of App. at 8-9.

Defendant, however, wholly fails

to articulate the basis for his conclusion that the prosecutor's
articulated reasons were "a mere excuse" for striking the juror
on racial grounds.
What defendant seeks are additional findings, articulating
that the prosecution's reasons were "(1) neutral, (2) related to
the case being tried, (3) clear and reasonably specific, and (4)
legitimate."

Br. of App. at 8 (citing Hiqqenbotham, 917 P.2d at
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548 (quoting Cantu II, 778 P.2d at 518 (citations omitted))).
While the record contains no such findings, their absence is not
fatal to the conviction because the record contains competent
evidence addressing the factors and supporting the trial court's
central finding of no racial intent.

State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d

789, 788 n.6 (Utah 1991)(citing Farrell v. Turner, 482 P.2d 117,
119 (1971)) .
First, the reasons were neutral on their face, as has been
explained.

Second, defendant in this case was a young, single,

gang-associated incarcerated male.

The prosecution's articulated

motivation to exclude a juror who was also young and single and
had friends in custody is thus closely related to the particular
case being tried.

Notably, the prosecution also struck another

young, single member of the venire, a woman whose daughter had
been fathered by a gang member.

See R. 103, R. 328: 29, 33. Two

of the State's peremptory challenges were thus used to strike
individuals whose lifestyles bore some resemblance to
defendant's.

Third, the reasons given were, on their face, clear

and specific: age, marital status, and close association with
persons in custody.

And, fourth, the reasons were legitimate

because they could apply to anyone, regardless of race.

See

Purkett, 514 U.S. at 769 (defining a "legitimate reason" as one
"that does not deny equal protection"); accord Merrill. 928 P.2d
at 404.
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Consequently, because defendant has not carried his burden
of persuasion, the trial court cannot be said to have committed
clear error when it accepted as credible the prosecutor's
explanation and denied defendant's challenge to the peremptory
strike.
POINT TWO

...

THE STATE ADDUCED SUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE TO DEMONSTRATE BOTH THAT
DEFENDANT WAS THE PERSON WHO SHOT
KENNY LEITER AND THAT DEFENDANT HAD
THE REQUISITE INTENT TO COMMIT
MURDER
Defendant argues that his conviction should be reversed

*

because the evidence of both his identity and his intent to
commit murder was insufficient to support the jury's verdict.
Br. of App. at 10-13.

At the outset, an appellate court's role

in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence following a criminal
conviction is a limited one.
(Utah 1994).

State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543

That is, a reviewing court will reverse a criminal

conviction on insufficiency grounds only when the evidence is so
lacking that "reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable
doubt'7 that defendant committed the crime.

State v. Petree, 659

P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983), superseded on other grounds. State v.
Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987).

However, "[w]here there is any

evidence, including reasonable inferences that can be drawn from
it, from which findings of all the elements of the crime can be
made beyond a reasonable doubt, our inquiry is complete and we
16
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will sustain the verdict/'

State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 285

(Utah 1989), cert, denied, 494 U.S. 1090 (1990).
Defendant asserts two grounds for his insufficiency claim.
First, he claims that the evidence was insufficient to establish
that he was the person who shot Kenny Leiter.

He argues that

Jody Carroll and Trevor Symes were inherently unreliable
witnesses, that Lori Nelson's testimony was both incomplete and
factually incorrect, and that defendant's mother and her exhusband provided the jury with credible evidence that exonerated
defendant.

See Br. of App. at 11-12.

The crux of defendant's argument - and its fatal flaw
his contention that the jury believed the wrong witnesses.
Br. of App. at 11-12.

- is
See

The law is well-settled that

"[d]eterminations of witness credibility are left to the jury.
The jury is free to believe or disbelieve all or part of any
witness's testimony."

State v. Haves, 860 P.2d 968, 972 (Utah

App. 1993) (citing State v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 901, 904-05 (Utah
App.), cert, denied, 804 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1990)).

And,

[w]hen the evidence presented is conflicting
or disputed, the jury serves as the exclusive
judge of both the credibility of witnesses
and the weight to be given particular
evidence. Ordinarily, a reviewing court may
not reassess credibility or reweigh the
evidence, but must resolve conflicts in the
evidence in favor of the jury verdict.
State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993) (citations
omitted).
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In this case, the jury did hear conflicting evidence from
witnesses for the State and witnesses for defendant.

The three

eyewitnesses to the shooting, however, all testified either
directly or implicitly that defendant was the person who shot
Kenny Leiter.

Jody Carroll testified that he saw defendant with

a gun, heard the gun click several times, and then saw Kenny
Leiter get hit (R. 328: 81-82, 85, 87). Trevor Symes testified
that he saw defendant pull out a gun, heard him say to Kenny
Leiter, "You're fucked now; I've got a gat", heard the gun click,
and then heard a shot as he ran to the car (Id. at

181-82).

Lori Nelson testified that a tall man was brandishing a long
metal object when a shorter man approached, pointing a gun at
Kenny Leiter and ultimately shooting him (Id. at 139-41, 152).8
The jury apparently chose to believe these witnesses rather
than defendant's central witness - his mother - and the other
gang members whose testimony attempted to impeach Carroll and
Symes.

Nonetheless, however credible the testimony of

defendant's central witness, it was not dispositive.

Defendant's

mother testified only that defendant was home watching the news

8

Jody Carroll testified that he was 6f2" or 6f3fl tall and
was armed with a tire iron, and that defendant was significantly
shorter, about 5'10" tall, and was armed with a handgun. R. 328:
70, 75, 107, 123. Trevor Symes corroborated that Carroll was the
individual with the tire iron. Id. at 178.
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on television at 9:00 pm.

R. 328: 278.8

occurred just prior to 8:27 pm.

The shooting, however,

Id. at 227. Where, as here,

defendant's insufficiency claim "presumes that the jury was
obligated to believe the evidence most favorable to defendant
rather than that presented in opposition by the State/' the claim
must necessarily fail.

State v. Howell. 649 P.2d 91, 97 (Utah

1982).
Second, defendant asserts that the State failed to prove
that the shooter intended to kill or even harm his victim.

See

Br. of App. at 12. "Evidence of intent is generally supplied by
evidence of the injury by which the victim died or of the act
which caused the death.

The inference is made that the natural

consequences of that act were intended to occur."

State v.

James, 819 P.2d 781, 790 (Utah 1991).
Defendant focuses on the act of shooting, inferring that the
failure of the gun to fire when defendant first pulled the
trigger gives rise to a reasonable inference that the shooter
"assumed the gun was unloaded" and was using it merely to
"assault and frighten" Leiter.

Br. of App. at 12.

inference is unpersuasive in light of the facts.

Such an

If defendant

had intended only to "assault and frighten" Leiter, he would have
likely brandished the weapon, encouraging Leiter to believe that

8

Defendant's mother's ex-husband stipulated that his
testimony would be the same as that of defendant's mother. R.
328: 292.
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it was loaded, rather than pulling the trigger and demonstrating
that it was not.
Further, defendant joined in the fight only after

Jody

Carroll had thrown his only weapon at Leiter, leaving Leiter
armed with a knife and the Crips wholly unarmed.

R. 328: 76-77,

82, 180) . A reasonable inference is that defendant used the
loaded .38 caliber handgun to regain the advantage the Crips lost
when Carroll discarded his weapon.
Of central significance, however, is the undisputed fact
that defendant pointed the handgun towards Kenny Leiter in the "
heat of a physical fight and pulled the trigger multiple times.
R. 328: 85, 111, 141, 152, 181-82.

The "natural consequence" of

that act was Leiter's death, caused by a bullet entering at his
left shoulder and piercing his carotid artery.
335.

R. 328: 329-30,

The very nature of these acts supports the jury's

determination that defendant committed the murder with the
requisite intent.
POINT THREE
BECAUSE DEFENDANT DID NOT PRESERVE
HIS PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT CLAIM,
IT IS WAIVED ON APPEAL
Defendant argues that the prosecutor referred to defendant
as a "wedo" or "light-skinned Mexican" during closing argument,
thus engaging in prosecutorial misconduct and mandating reversal
of his conviction for murder.

Br. of App. at 13-14.
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This

argument, however, has not been properly preserved for appellate
review.
The law is well-settled that "in criminal cases in Utah • .
. a contemporaneous objection or some form of specific
preservation of claims of error must be made part of the trial
court record before an appellate court will review such claim on
appeal."

State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 1987).9

In

this case, the trial record contains no evidence of preservation.
Defendant thus relies for preservation of his argument on his
Stipulation to Supplement the Record, which references an offthe-record bench conference in which defendant purportedly asked
for a curative instruction with respect to the prosecutor's
remark.

See addendum B.

This document, however, does not preserve his claim.
Defendant filed his Stipulation to Supplement the Record in this
Court, just a few days prior to filing his opening appellate
brief, which relied wholly on averments in the pending
stipulation.

The pleading, however, should have been filed in

the district court.

See Utah R. App. P. 11(h)("If any difference

arises as to whether the record truly discloses what occurred in
the trial court, the difference shall be submitted to and settled

Plain error and exceptional circumstances constitute two
exceptions to this general rule. See, e.g. State v. Archambeau,
820 P.2d 920, 922 n. 4, 5 (Utah App. 1991). Neither have been
asserted here.
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by that court and the record made to conform to the truth" ) . To
correct defendant's filing error, this Court remanded the case to
the district court for the limited purpose of having the trial
court consider and rule upon the stipulation.
The district court held a hearing on defendant's motion and
subsequently refused to accede to the stipulation, articulating
its reasons in a comprehensive minute entry.

See Minute Entry of

9/13/99, unnumbered at top of appellate record, vol. II, or
addendum C.

Specifically, the trial court determined that

"[n]either this Court nor the prosecutor have specific
recollection of the side bar discussion referred to" and that the
averments in the stipulation did not comport with the court's
customary procedures in conducting trials.

Id.

Because the trial court rejected the stipulation, which was
the only evidence of preservation, it cannot at this juncture
serve to preserve defendant's prosecutorial misconduct claim.
The claim, therefore, is waived.

Further, defendant does not

claim plain error or exceptional circumstances.

Consequently, it

is not appropriate to reach the issue under either of those
exceptions to the preservation requirement.

State v. Pledger,

896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995).
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POINT FOUR
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY IMPOSED
A GANG ENHANCEMENT ON DEFENDANT'S
SENTENCE; CONSEQUENTLY, THE CASE
SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR A NEW TRIAL
BY JURY ON THE GANG ENHANCEMENT
CHARGE
Three days prior to defendant's sentencing hearing, the Utah
Supreme Court issued State v. Lopes. 980 P.2d 191 (Utah 1999).
In that opinion, the court held that Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1
(1995), the "gang" enhancement or "group criminal activity7'
statute, "creates a separate and new offense/' and that each
element of that offense "must be found beyond a reasonable doubt
by a jury, not the trial judge."

Id. at 195.

In this case, the jury found defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt of all the elements of criminal homicide,
murder.

R. 270.

It did not make any determination of

defendant's guilt under section 76-3-203.1.
determination was left to the trial court.

Rather, that
See R. 288, 330: 15.

According to Lopes, the judge thus improperly became the finder
of fact, "expressly taking that power away from the jury."
Lopez, 980 P.2d at 196.

This was incorrect as a matter of law.

Consequently, the gang enhancement here must be reversed,
and the case remanded to the district court for a new trial on
that charge.

Defendant's jury conviction for murder, however,

should remain undisturbed.

See id., at 194-95 (reversed and

remanded for new trial only on section 76-3-203.1 charge).
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's
first degree felony conviction for criminal homicide, murder, and
reverse and remand for a new trial on the section 76-3-203.1 gang
enhancement charge.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this {Q_ day of December, 1999.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

#*&- (L~
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JOANNE C. SLOTNIK
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the
foregoing brief of appellee were mailed first-class, postage
prepaid, to Samuel D. McVey, attorney for defendant, Kirton &
McConkie, 1800 Eagle Gate Tower, 60 East South Temple, P.O. Box
45120, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120, this JQ_ day of December,
1999.
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214

- Colloquy THE COURT:

Members of the jury, we are going

to take a recess for you.

Approximately ten minutes.

Remember the admonition.
I will discuss a matter of law with the
lawyers here•
The jury is now excused.
(Jury out) 3:52
THE COURT:
courtroom.

The jury has now exited the

The defendant and counsel is present.
I indicated to you, Mr. McVey, at one of our

bench conferences that I would grant you an
opportunity to make an objection on the record
regarding a claim which preceded in which you
perceived an inappropriate striking of the only
minority juror on the panel.
You may proceed.
MR. McVEY:

Lance Masina.

Yes, Your Honor.

Lance Masina, who was a prospective juror on
the panel, was peremptorily stricken by the
prosecution.
My perception was that he was the only
minority potential juror and appeared to have
characteristics of a South Pacific Islander or similar
characteristics and possibly some Hispanic
characteristics.

And based on that, we believe that
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- Colloquy -
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we have a prima facia case for a Batson v. Kentucky
error in violation of our client 's 5th, 6th and 14th
rights under -- the 14th Amendment right under the
Federal Constitution and, also, corresponding clauses
under the State Constitution.
THE COURT:

All right, 1Mr. McVey.

Thank you.

Do you wish to respond , Mr. Esqueda?
MR. ESQUEDA:

If I may.

I'm not sure Batson is appropriate.
defendant is not a minority.
THE COURT:

The

He is a Caucasian.

Well, let's assume for the

purposes of this discussion that he is entitled to
claim the cloak of minority status given the
circumstances.
MR. ESQUEDA:

And even <assuming that is true,

Your Honor, the reason Mr. Masina was stricken by the
State was his direct response to a question posed by
the defense counsel of whether t]ley knew anyone in
jail.

And Mr. Masina stated in the affirmative, that

he did know people in jail.

And based upon that

response, that is the reason we moved to -- we
peremptory struck Mr. Masina.
The other reason is we thought he was young
and single.

It had nothing to do with his race.

THE COURT:

Very well.
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I can Indicate on the jury list that
Mr. Maslna was number ten and It did appear to me that
he had certain Pacific Islander characteristics.

I

concur with your observations of that.
I have no idea if anyone on the panel had a
minority background.

None appeared to have Hispanic

or minority names, surnames.
Let me inquire of you, Mr. McVey.
client in any fashion a minority?

Is your

Part of a minority

culture?
MR. McVEY:

He is not, Your Honor.

But I

don't believe Batson requires that.
THE COURT:

Maybe it doesn't.

I am just

establishing for the record that he is not Hispanic or
in another minority.
MR. McVEY:

The other jurors looked very

Caucasian in appearance, as well.
THE COURT:

I am persuaded, counsel, that the

prosecution has sufficiently rebutted the notion that
there -• that they were out simply to strike minority
members of the panel and that they have provided to me
sufficient reason for having exercised the peremptory
challenge that was wholly unrelated to Mr. Maslna 1 s at
least claimed minority status.
Therefore, your motion is denied.
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Immediately after the prosecution's closing argument, and before the defense closing
argument, lead defense counsel Samuel McVey asked for a bench conference where he stated an
objection that the prosecutor had argued a fact not in evidence. The Prosecutor argued:
Who is this Mexican Guy? Take a look at the defendant. If he is wearing a hat and dark
clothes, as Lori Nelson testifies, he probably looks Hispanic. He looks a little light in my
community. They call them a wedo. That means he is a light skinned Mexican.
Mr. McVey asked the judge for a curative instruction that the prosecutor's statement was not
evidence and the jury should disregard it. The judge stated that he would simply wait and
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instruct the jury later that the arguments of counsel are not evidence. There was no specific
direction to disregard the prosecutor's statement.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff(s) ,

5

MINUTE ENTRY RULING

:

CASE NO. 981911378 FS

:

Judge J. Dennis Frederick

JASON RANDY BIGGS,

:

Date: September 13, 1999

Defendant(s),

:

vs.

After review of the pleadings, the Court rules as
follows:
1. This Court is unable to accede to the stipulation to
modify the record for the following reasons:
a) Neither this Court nor the prosecutor have specific
recollection of the side bar discussion referred to;
b) The trial transcript reflects an off the record
discussion at the request of defense counsel (TR 380)
at the conclusion of the prosecutor's rebuttal
argument only. This discussion, was at the moment the
jury was to be released for deliberation. This Court
would not have had any further opportunity to admonish
the jury. It makes no sense, nor is it this Court's
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procedure to *wait and instruct the jury later" at the
moment they are released to consider their verdict.
c) This Court frequently admonishes juries that comments
of counsel are not evidence and indeed did so
throughout this trial. It is uncharacteristic for this
Court to have denied such a request. Moreover, this
Court's trial notes do not reflect such a request. If
there was an agreed to additional instruction, there
would by practice be a note thereof.
d) The proposed quote (TR 377) of the prosecutor is not
complete and thus creates a misleading impression when
taken out of context.

Dated this 13th day of September, 199,
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